On Moral Objectivism

Alex Whitlock, for whom I have great respect, and I have gotten into a fascinating discussion on ethics over on his blog.  Rather than pontificate endlessly in the comments, I'm going to preserve his bandwidth and continue the discussion over here.

The context of the discussion is a post on -- gulp! -- abortion, but lest dear user of TP get too excited, let me assure you that my post is going to quickly devolve into a tedious discussion of ethical theory.  And right rapidly so, at that.

I'm most interested in responding to Alex's third comment, in which Alex is examining whether an individual who professors moral distate for abortion while simultaneously opines that it should remain legal is being ethically inconsistent.  I asserted that there is no logical or moral inconsistency in such a position, a point to which Alex does not seem to quibble with, other than to contend that a position allows for "convenient moral flexibility."

I will say that I am not sure what Alex means by "moral flexibility."  As someone who denies the objectivity and/or absoluteness of morality, I tend to see an inherent flexibility there. But, so long as Alex and I agree there's no inherent inconsistency in the position, I don't think we have much argument there aside from tone.

But I do think Alex and I have different views on the nature of morality, and that these differences lie at the heart of a very real disagreement we do have.

Alex proffers what he terms the 'reverse hypocrisy' thesis, formulated as follows:

"It also ties in to what I call reverse hypocrisy: the belief that something is wrong for me to do, but not necessarily wrong for others."

Now, bear in mind the moral schema Alex is operating from here is a belief in objective morality, that there is an objectively correct action or moral law that defines right action.  Of course, to someone like TP, who more or less rejects moral objectivism, to someone sympathetic to some strands of ethical relativism, the notion that what is right for an agent in one set of circumstances may be morally wrong for a different agent in either the same or different circumstances (there are different notions of relativism that rely on a notion of morality relative to the subject [called subjectivism] and a notion of morality relative to the circumstances [called conventialism]) is not only hypocritical in no way, but is the very essence of ethics.

Sidebar: Let me pause here to make an important aside: I am in no way arguing either for/against moral objectivism or for/against moral subjectivism, nor will I do so.  I have found no topic more ill-suited to blogospheric exposition, more likely to invoke Godwin's law and histrionic commenting and trackbacks (I am guilty of it as well), then the profession of support for a morally subjectivist or ethically relativist position.  Thus, while I am more than happy to discuss moral issues in a meta-sense, as in this post, I am simply not going to engage in a full-scale discussion of the defensibility of moral objectivism or moral subjectivism in the blogosphere.

Really, what interests me here is not the validity of either my or Alex's position, but the nature of our disagreement, which turns whether on tends to accept a morally objectivist position or not.

To return to the substantive discussion, interestingly, Alex does not seem to endorse what I would term a strong moral objectivist position.  That is, in his next formulation, Alex seems to allow for some 'moral flexibility' based on circumstance:

"If it's wrong for you, then unless there is a distinct difference in situation, it's wrong for someone else to."

Note the logical qualifier here: "unless there is a distinct difference in situation."  Now, of course, such a position is entirely consistent with a morally objectivist viewpoint.  One can still endorse objectivism -- such as principalism -- while allowing for differences based on context.  One can find a morally objective basis for a moral law or rule, for example, while acknowledging that the application of the objective rule may dictate different, even seemingly inconsistent results in different circumstances.  My only point here is that such an allowance seems to derail the notion of strong moral objectivism.  A strong moral objectivist may well deny any flexibility based on context: what is right is right in all circumstances.

Alex concludes with an example of what he sees as reverse hypocrisy:

"if Joe doesn't drink for moral reasons (say he's a Mormon or Pentacostal), but then says that it's morally okay for Jack to drink because he is an atheist, then Joe is being the opposite of whatever hypocrisy is."

Respectfully, I'm not sure this follows unless one already accepts some version of moral objectivism.  If one begins by rejecting the notion that morality necessarily transcends subjects or circumstances, then there is no reason why Joe's belief that it would be immoral for him to drink but not for Jack (based on his knowledge that he and Jack do not have the same basis for their moral beliefs) is either hypocritical or "reversely hypocritical."  Rather, to the moral subjectivist or ethical relativist, it is entirely trivial.

And this brings up another important point: the all-too-common conflation of cultural relativism with ethical relativism.  The former is also entirely trivial: it simply acknowledges that persons of different cultures have different moral beliefs -- that the fact of what people do belive in terms of morality (not what they ought to believe, but simply what their beliefs on morality actually are, as an empirical matter) differ across cultures.  This is a descriptive thesis.  It does not posit what people should believe; it simply points out that people of different cultures often have different, and even profoundly different moral systems.

Ethical relativism is normative; it is the belief that determining right action ought to be relative to the subject, or the culture, or another referent, not simply that morality is culturally relative.

To return to Alex's example, the fact that Joe and Jack have different moral compasses should be entirely uncontroversial given their differences on the nature and source of their own moral beliefs.  Joe probably understands full well that Jack does not share his ethical beliefs.  Given that, why does it follow that it is 'reversely hypocritical' for Joe to conclude that he must act in a certain way, but that Jack is not bound to act in that way?  Why can Joe not say, with no 'reverse hypocrisy,' that only those who already agree with his moral beliefs must act according to their dictates? Why can he not acknowledge that those who reject his beliefs, like Jack, are under no obligation to act according to them?

Fascinating questions, surely.  I will conclude by noting that Alex's thesis is essentially the universalizability requirement, a notion that we can thank Herr Kant for.  I'd also add that the vast majority of work in ethics being done today either expressly or tacitly adopts the universalization criterion, and that those, like myself, who are dubious as to its validity, are, I daresay, in the minority.

Thoughts?

Comments

[teahouseblossom]

Whoa, that was pretty deep. Unfortunately I can't function mentally without my morning coffee. But I did do a paper on Kant in college.

[a-train]

good stuff, mr. tp. there was a post along these lines (sort of)at lawyers, guns and money. here.

[TP]

Who can function without their morning coffee, THB? Not I.

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